

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DOS Review Completed.

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INFORMATION  
August 31, 1973

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE  
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: HENRY A. KISSINGER  
FROM: L. S. EAGLEBURGER  
SUBJECT: Your Meeting with David Bruce:  
China Matters

1. Your Trip: As Ambassador Bruce knows, we proposed some time between October 21-29, or October 3-6. (The notes we gave the Chinese are at Tab A.) On Wednesday, Ch'iao told Bruce that they "welcome your visit to China in October."
2. Chinese Political Developments: Ambassador Bruce's report of his conversation with Ch'iao is at Tab B. It was far from profound. Ch'iao gave assurances, however, that "the development of our relations should be considered normal." You will be interested in Bruce's judgment of the significance of the 10th Party Congress. (Solomon's analysis is at Tab C.)
3. North Korean Demarche: The Jenkins/Holdridge report on their meeting with the North Koreans at the USLO is at Tab D. The Koreans asked about privileges and immunities at the UN. We have asked for Rush's recommendations on responding to the North Korean inquiries.

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5. USLO Housing in Peking: USLO had been told we would lose two out of four senior-level apartments. At Bruce's request, we raised the matter here with Chi Ch'iao Chu and Tsien Ta-yung. Chi said they "understood our request." We have received no other feedback here. (There are hints in Peking, however, that the Chinese are coming around.)

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HAKTO - 9

August 23, 1973

TO: AMBASSADOR BRUCE

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER *HK*

Many thanks for the thoughtful note from you and Evangeline. I greatly appreciate your good wishes.

We have just passed to Han Hsu the following note and accompanying oral comment: [Quote text attached].

State will be requesting your early return for consultations. I greatly need your sage counsel regarding organizational and personnel moves which need to be made in the Department.

As noted in the oral comment, you should seek meeting with Chou and Ch'iao Kuang-hua before you leave. Should they have any urgent business which cannot await my visit to Peking, would appreciate you initiating the dialogue, on which we can then confer while you are here.

We are seeking views of Habib and President Park on North Korean request to meet with one of your people. We are inclined to accept but will advise you shortly. In the meantime, please inform the North Koreans that you are waiting for instructions.

Warm regards.

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The dates suggested by the Chinese side in the note passed on August 17 are not now convenient for the U.S. side because of impending change in U.S. Government organization with which the Chinese side is now undoubtedly familiar.

However, Dr. Kissinger would consider, especially in light of these changes, an exchange of views with the Chinese side highly desirable. The best time for Dr. Kissinger to visit China would be for any three-day period between October 21 and October 29. If this is inconvenient or if the Chinese side considers an earlier meeting desirable, Dr. Kissinger could visit the People's Republic of China from October 3 through October 6.

Dr. Kissinger would appreciate the views of the Chinese side on the specific dates suggested.

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Oral Comment

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Dr. Kissinger has, in addition, a personal comment which he wishes to make to the Prime Minister.

As far as Dr. Kissinger is concerned, U.S. - Chinese relations constitute a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. He further considers that, in light of the great danger which he foresees, it is increasingly important that synchronization between the policies of the United States and the People's Republic of China take place. As stated in the note, Dr. Kissinger is certainly prepared to visit China, but it will not be possible for him to do so while his confirmation hearings before the Senate are taking place and during the period of the opening of the fall session of the United Nations General Assembly. If it is considered by the Chinese side to be essential, Dr. Kissinger could visit China between October 3 and October 6, but by far the most convenient time would be between October 21 and October 29.

Dr. Kissinger is recalling Ambassador Bruce for a week or so in order that Ambassador Bruce may assist him in the reorganization of the Department of State. Ambassador Bruce will request an appointment with the Prime Minister and the Vice Foreign Minister before his departure. If they will give Ambassador Bruce any messages they may have, Bruce will be authorized to discuss any interim measures which may be appropriate prior to Dr. Kissinger's visit.

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PEKING 37

August 29, 1973

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TO: HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: DAVID BRUCE

SUBJECT: My Meeting with Ch'iao Kuan-hua

1. I called on Ch'iao Kuan-hua at Ministry of Foreign Affairs at 11:00 on August 29, accompanied by Jenkins and Holdridge. In addition to Ch'iao, on Chinese side were Li'ping, Chao Ch'i-Hua, and Chen Jo-Yun, all from Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2. After usual preliminaries I asked if Chinese had received report of your conversation with Han Hsu. Ch'iao responded affirmatively. I then noted that your conversation had consisted of two sessions, one written and the other oral. In the oral presentation, you had spoken of the great importance you attached to the relationship between the PRC and US, and that you regarded it as essential to synchronize policies between our two countries. I noted that several days later you had sent a message to me saying you hoped before I left that I would see Ch'iao and Prime Minister Chou and to ask if they would not be helpful in connection with your new appointment by outlining Chinese views of the current relationship between China and the US. I added that I had been informed only this morning that on Saturday you had expected to see our Ambassadors to South Korea, India, and the Phillipines, plus others, presumably including those from the Asian region. This indicated the importance which you attach to complications on Asian affairs.
3. Turning to the timing of your assuming your new position, I said that present Secretary of State would relinquish office formally on September 3, after which your nomination required confirmation by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee headed by Senator Fulbright and, if after SFRC approved your appointment, nomination would be submitted to full Senate. Ordinarily, the consent of the full Senate to SFRC report was forthcoming quickly, but I surmised during your appearance before the committee would be questioned on a great number of problems and process might be lengthy. I did not know when the hearings would commence, but they were likely to do so by next week.

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I told Ch'iao that this was background until you were confirmed and that in meantime you were known as "Secretary of State-Designate."

4. I observed also that one of the questions which would be asked of you was your views on the status of relationship between our two countries, and assumed for that reason a frank expression by Ch'iao as to this relationship would be useful to you, including reference to those areas of differences which could create problems for us. In other words, I said, I was almost asking Ch'iao to deliver a monologue.

5. With reference to relations between our two countries, Ch'iao stated that during your visit to China, especially February visit, both sides had exchanged views fully. As for actual situation in relations between our two countries, something objective existed: I was in Peking and the Chinese had their Liaison Office in Washington. This signified that our relations were "developing". As to Ch'iao's views on these relations, he felt that you had your own views and the Chinese had theirs. To sum up, Ch'iao said, he felt we both understood each other regarding our differences and area of agreement. The Shanghai Joint Communique was an example, because it both stated differences and points of accord. This was our new style - not to attempt to hide our differences, but to admit them frankly. Ch'iao credited you with having contributed much to the joint communique in the course of drafting it.

6. Ch'iao next declared that he thought "the development in our relations should be considered normal." He noted that last time he and I exchanged views we had discussed state of mutual relations as well as general situation. All he wanted to know was to ask me to convey congratulations of Prime Minister, Foreign Minister Chi, as well as his own on your appointment as Secretary of State. Ch'iao said that Chinese "welcome your visit to China in October." They would be in touch with us sometime later on as to specific date. Aside from this matter, there was nothing else new which they would like to discuss with me. If anything came up while I was in the U.S., he would get in touch with Jenkins and Holdridge. He wished me Bon Voyage and hoped my journey would not be too tiring.

7. I prodded Ch'iao as to whether he foresaw any specific problems which might cause either side difficulties, other than those which might flow from the differences of opinion already

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expressed in the joint communique. Ch'iao remarked that with the differences already stated in the joint communique, new differences might appear with new situations, but that would not be strange. But there was a good point here - both sides admitted their differences and did not cover them up. We could have a further exchange of views in the future.

End Section 1 of 2

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Final Section of Peking 37

8. I tried again to draw Ch'iao out on any problems, asking if there were any immediate issues which had not been discussed in the past or which you or your representatives in Washington had not raised with their representatives. Were there such which might cause concern in our relationship? Ch'iao replied that "as our side sees it, there is not any immediate problem."

9. Nothing else of substance emerged from the conversation. Ch'iao proceeded to ask me about how much time it might take for your appointment to clear the Senate, probably in connection with scheduling your visit to China, and I told him that the SFRC hearings might extend over several days and possibly a week. Ch'iao said that as the Chinese saw it, your appointment was welcomed by both U.S. political parties and people of different circles in American society. I agreed, noting that reaction in Europe had also been very favorable. Ch'iao said he believed that you would handle the hearings very well because your ability was high -- he admired you for this. You also knew how to handle correspondents. He wondered what the Japanese reaction had been to your appointment, to which I replied that their reaction was not yet evident but they had respect for your knowledge and would find from their standpoint your appointment would be a fortunate one. In Europe our relations would certainly be strengthened, including the negotiations going on between the U.S. and European governments. I recalled your long background in European affairs, going back to before time you had joined the government.

10. Ch'iao ended by promising a further conversation after I returned.

11. Comment: Ch'iao appeared blandly non committal on the state of US-PRC relations, but at least described them as being good and as making progress via our respective liaison offices. In view of the internal political events going on here at this time, which we have reported both in this and in other channels, it seems that Chinese at this time wish to keep their relationship with us in the background so it does not intrude unduly into whatever domestic political maneuverings may be going on.

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12. In just the last few days Chinese have sharpened their criticisms of the Soviet Union. While we are not attempting to encourage such criticisms, the pointed singling out of the USSR as an element hostile to China inevitably put Chinese relationship with us in a better light internally. We ourselves are not receiving a hostile press in Peking, although there is occasional low-level niping in connection with Indo-China and Korea. Incidentally, I deliberately did not raise Cambodian situation with Ch'iao, believing if so, he would deal with this in same way he dealt with state of US-PRC relations, i.e., "we know where our differences lie."

13. Although Ch'iao was as usual polite and amiable it was clear that he had no desire to prolong a conversation that was degenerating into pleasantries. At no point was any reference made to the Prime Minister except my mentioning instructions from you to call on him and on Ch'iao, and the message of congratulations from Prime Minister to you.

14. Warm Regards.

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MEMORANDUM

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## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

URGENT INFORMATIONCONFIDENTIAL

August 29, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER

FROM: RICHARD H. SOLOMON *RHS*

SUBJECT: Chinese Communist Party Concludes  
10th Congress: Chou En-lai Holds the Line

NCNA announced today that the Chinese Communist Party held its 10th National Congress between August 24 and 28. The official press communique of the Congress -- which was said to have been held "solemnly" in Peking with Chairman Mao presiding -- conveys the impression of a very brief series of meetings focussed on leadership problems that have not been fully resolved. There is no indication that the contentious social and economic problems which have been visibly debated in the press in the past two months were dealt with by the Congress; indeed, Chou En-lai and his supporters probably sought to avoid such debate and limit the Congress agenda to issues on which they could prevail. The leadership lineup partially revealed by the Congress communique indicates that Chou strengthened the organizational position of his supporters, while Mao's wife slipped somewhat in her position.

The following are the most interesting points revealed in the Congress communique:

-- The Lin Piao "anti-Party clique" was "indignantly denounced" by the Congress. This is the first time that Lin, and his co-conspirator Ch'en Po-ta, have been explicitly named in the press. They were said to have been expelled from the Party for their crimes. Curiously, the military leaders involved in the Lin plot were not named, and only indirect reference was made to Congress approval of "measures taken with regard to them." This suggests that the leadership continues to tread cautiously in its relations with the military. Most surprising, the communique indicates that the effects of the Lin Piao affair have not been settled when it states that the Congress decided, "At present we should continue to put the task of criticizing Lin Piao... above all else."

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-- Leadership relations, as revealed in the communiqué, indicate Chou En-lai further consolidating his organizational position. Two long-time leaders associated with the Premier, one an agricultural specialist, who had been purged during the Cultural Revolution were rehabilitated and named to the new Central Committee. The Shanghai leader Chang Ch'un-ch'iao -- once associated with the "left", but in the past three years increasingly a Chou man -- was Secretary-General of the Congress. His protégé Wang Hung-wen (age 31), was the most notable young individual advanced by the meetings. In a meteoric rise to prominence, Wang delivered a report to the Congress on the revision of the Party constitution. He also appears to have been elevated to the Politburo Standing Committee. At the same time, Chiang Ch'ing (Mao's wife) and her protégé Yao Wen-yuan, appear to have slipped several notches in the leadership ranking. (Confirmation of this, however, awaits a formal announcement of the new Politburo, which may not come for a week or so.)

-- The Congress apparently was very conscious of the process of generational transition, and of the succession problem. Reference was made to the fact that the new Central Committee "embodies a combination of the old, the middle aged, and the young," and that the Party "has no lack of successors." It remains unclear whether the new Party Constitution embodies an institutional mechanism for handling the succession problem, however. Hopefully, this document, and Chou En-lai's political report to the Congress, will be published in coming days, thus helping us to clarify the results of the meetings.

-- International affairs were characterized by "great disorder on the earth." The chaos, however, was said to be a good thing, and not a bad thing." The Party stressed the need to uphold "proletarian internationalism" and oppose "the hegemonism of the two superpowers -- the U. S. and the USSR." There was no explicit reaffirmation in the Congress document of the current PRC foreign policy orientation, but the election of Foreign Minister Chi P'eng-fei, Vice Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua, and Ambassadors Huang Chen and Huang Hua to the Central Committee implies strong continuity for Chou's positions.

The communiqué ends on an ominous note by calling on the Chinese people to "strengthen without fail their preparations against wars of aggression... particularly against surprise attacks by social-imperialism and be ready to wipe out resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely, any enemy that dare invade us!"

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In sum, Chou En-lai (and Mao) appear to have held the line on their current policies, but apparently continue to sit on an unstable set of leadership relations (particularly in dealings with the military). The Congress does not appear to have built a consensus on a range of social and economic issues facing China. In an ironic way, the failure of the Congress to wrap up the Lin Piao affair -- the call for continuing criticism of the man and his plotting; and renewal of Mao's admonition, "Be open and aboveboard; don't intrigue and conspire" -- conveys the image of a political system hung up on its own problems, in a manner reminiscent of things closer to home. At the same time, Premier Chou has strengthened his organizational position with the election to the Central Committee of men close to him. Thus, he has added resources to build for the future.

These initial impressions of the results of the 10th Congress hopefully will be strengthened and elaborated in more detail by documentation (Chou's political report, the new Party Constitution) which may be made public in coming days.

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PEKING 034

August 28, 1973

TO: KENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: DAVID BRUCE

SUBJECT: Call on USLO by North Korean Charge in Peking

1. North Korean Charge Li Jaepil, accompanied by First Secretary Sin Jido, called on USLO per his request at 5:30 P.M., 27 August. They were received by Jenkins and Holdridge. Li drove into US compound in large Hunghecm'i Limousine, but I do not believe he was observed except by members of our immediate staff and the Chinese P.L.A. guards at the gate.

2. Li did not waste time on pleasantries and promptly got down to business. Referring to fact that members of DPRK Permanent Observer Mission to UN had already obtained U.S. visas from U.S. Embassy in Moscow, he handed over list of this mission (they will be forwarded by SEPTTEL).

3. Li then stated he wanted to discuss some problems directly concerned with entry into U.S. of members of DPRK staff Permanent Observer Mission. He understood that U.N. Secretary General Waldheim had reached agreement with U.S. government on question of treatment of DPRK Mission after which Waldheim had informed North Koreans (by letter on June 29) that their personnel would receive every convenience. However, Li wanted a direct reply from U.S. government confirming that DPRK Permanent Observer to the UN and all other members of his mission would be provided with:

a. Diplomatic privileges and prerogatives in accordance with international law and practices;

b. Guarantee of safety of Permanent Observer and mission members;

c. Inviolability of DPRKs missions office building, houses, property, conveyances, etc.

d. Insurance of inviolability of cryptographic communication and diplomatic courier services;

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e. Guarantee of exemption from trial, exemption from inspection of luggage at point of entry;

f. Right to fly national flag.

Li laid particular stress on U.S. government providing official guarantee to DPRK government on personal safety of its Permanent Observer to the UN and other members of his mission, and anticipated that this would be forthcoming "considering that your government respects international law and practices."

4. Jenkins told Li that we would be glad to transmit this request and would ask for a detailed reply as soon as possible. He expressed confidence that normal diplomatic privileges and protection would be extended to the North Koreans in New York and they would be afforded those things necessary for the successful and safe operation of their mission. Holdridge added that U.S. took its position as host government for the UN very seriously. In response to remark from Li that North Korean Embassy in Peking would be waiting for U.S. reply, Jenkins stated that we would be in touch with them as soon as answer received.

5. Li then raised question of meaning of G-3 visa which had been issued to Koreans in Moscow. After checking Jenkins provided him with explanation on this point.

6. Jenkins suggested to Li that it would be in interest of both parties not to arouse speculation as to why this meeting had taken place, and accordingly proposed that it be kept secret. Li said that he fully understood and also hoped that meeting and subject discussed would not be publicized. He pointed out that meeting was significant in that it was perhaps the first time such a contact between diplomats of DPRK and U.S. had occurred. Li at this point declined offer of refreshment from Jenkins and departed pleading pressure of business, but hoped that more time would be available later on.

7. We here now are obliged to follow up with information and assurances requested by North Koreans. I trust that this will not present any particular difficulties for you, and that we will be in a position to reply to them soon. You will note that they spoke of "guarantee" regarding security and other matters affecting their UN mission. I assume that we will not go beyond the confines of arrangements normally offered other

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UN missions, including those of countries we do not recognize.

8. I have the impression that despite the relatively non-substantive nature of this initial contact, the North Koreans had somewhat something larger in mind: namely, to test the atmospherics in USLO and on the part of the U.S. government toward further contacts of a possibly more substantive nature. This might be deduced from the fact that North Koreans could have approached the U.S. government in a number of different locations, e.g., Moscow, regarding the questions which they raised (or indeed could have gone through third parties such as the Chinese). The appearance of the North Korean charge in person rather than a lesser member of his staff lends further height to my supposition. Pyong Yang could look upon Peking as a convenient - and safe - place to deal directly with the U.S. when or if such a course is determined. Peking is probably aware of these considerations and may well have encouraged the North Koreans in approaching us directly here. In my opinion, the Chinese in all likelihood knew in advance of the August 27 meeting.

9. Warm Regards.

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